The cruise shipping industry in the corporate mergers and overpanamax eras. A comparison with the container shipping industry by Charlier, J.
The cruise shipping industry in the
corporate mergers and overpanamax
eras. A comparison with the container
shipping industry
Le secteur des croisières à l’heure des fusions armatoriales et des unités
overpanamax. Une comparaison avec le secteur des conteneurs
Jacques Charlier
1 Cruise shipping is one of the hottest segments of the shipping industry (Peisley, 1997 and
2004; Wild & Dearing, 1999 and 2004a) and is characterized by a series of similarities with
the recent evolution of the container shipping industry. The geographical dimension of
its globalization has already been explored in two edited books (Casteljon & Charlier,
2000; Dowling, 2004), as well as in a few papers, including a previous series from this
author (Arnold & Charlier, 1999; Charlier, 1996 and 2000a; Charlier & Arnold, 1997), as
well  as  in  a  recent  book  chapter  (Hall,  2004),  but  little  has  been  written  about  the
corporate and technical dimensions of this process. This paper aims at filling partly the
gap by establishing a qualitative comparison between the container and cruise shipping
industries, by focussing here upon two unexplored dimensions, namely on the one hand
the ownership structure and the concentration process it has experienced, and on the
other hand the increasing size of the vessels and the rise of overpanamax-sized ships.
Many authors refer to postpanamax ships, but this is not a question of evolution in time,
actually; as this is a matter of size, we feel that overpanamax is a more appropriate term,
and this will be used systematically hereafter. Panamax-sized ships are able to transit the
Panama Canal, whose locks accept vessels with a beam up to 32.3 m, and overpanamax
ships  are  therefore  too wide to  enter  into the  Panama locks,  whereas  infrapanamax
vessels fit more or less easily into the locks. However, this is also a question of length, as
Panama’s locks only allow the transit of cruise ships up to 294.5 m long (and slightly less
for containerships).
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2 As the container industry is  much more well-known than cruise shipping,  these two
industries will not be dealt with here on equal foot, and more space will be devoted to the
second than to the first. Therefore, only second-hand statistical material will be used
when referring to containers in the first section, whereas all the figures quoted at the
third  section  for  the  cruise  industry  are  original  and  are  the  product  of  a  specific
statistical research for this paper. As far as the geographical background is concerned, in
itself the topic of another paper, container shipping is, for many years, a global industry
(Slack, 1998 and 1999), whereas cruise shipping is still in a process of spatial expansion.
Most of its offer is currently in North American or European waters, but there is a big
medium- and long term potential for the Asia-Pacific region. By contrast, as for container
shipping, cruising in the waters of the developing world (especially intertropical Africa)
will remain marginal in the foreseeable future. 
 
Container shipping in the overpanamax and corporate
mergers eras
3 According to the 2003 issue of Containerisation International’s Yearbook, the leading source
for the container industry, the world fully cellular fleet (a cellular ship is a container ship
with cell guides in its holds) amounted to 2,981 ships as at 01-11-2002 (Table 1). For the
first time in maritime history, its overall carrying capacity reached 6 million TEUs, or
Twenty Equivalent Units (Table 2). These are standard containers with a length of 20 feet,
and a 40 feet container accounts thus for two TEUs. The capacity of container ships is
always shown in TEUs, whereas they usually carry a combination of 20 and 40 feet boxes
(there is a trend towards longer containers of 45 or 48 feet, but the TEU is nowadays a
well-established measurement unit).
 
Table 1. Structure of the world container fleet as at 01-11-2002 by number of ocean-going ships.
4  
(*) Includes conbulkers, conros, roros, semi-containerships, multipurpose vessels and container/
barge carriers
Computed from Containerisation International’s Yearbook 2003 
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Table 2. Structure of the world container fleet as at 01-11-2002 by number of slots (‘000 TEUs).
(*) Includes conbulkers, conros, roros, semi-containerships, multipurpose vessels and container/
barge carriers
Computed from Containerisation International’s Yearbook 2003 
5 Taking into consideration other types of vessels also able to take containers aboard, such
as conbulkers, conros, roros, semi-containerships, multipurpose vessels and container/
barge carriers, the world container fleet amounted then to 7,274 ocean-going ships, with
a total theoretical carrying capacity of nearly 7.3 million TEUs (however, this is less in the
real  shipping  world,  as  the  additional  4,263  non  cellular  vessels  do  not  carry  only
containers). Even if more recent data are currently available, we will refer hereafter to
capacity  figures  registered  at  the  end of  2002  in  order  to  compare  the  state  of  the
container industry with that of the cruise industry in early 2003 when the latter faced a
major change in its corporate structure.  Even if  the situation has changed somewhat
since that time, this was the most appropriate time for such a comparison as far as the
concentration degree of  both industries is  concerned.  Therefore,  many of the vessels
shown in our tables as on order have been delivered in the meantime, and other new
orders have been placed in 2003 and 2004 for container ships as for cruise ships.
6 As seen before for the tanker and dry bulk industries (Hilling & Browne, 1998), container
shipping lines have developed their fleets by ordering bigger vessels in order to meet an
ever increasing demand, in a typical search for economies of scale (Lim, 1998; Cullinane &
Khanna,  2000;  Cariou,  2000;  Wild  &  Dearing,  2004b).  However,  they  faced  more
constraints,  because of the need to serve a much higher number of ports (Marcadon,
2004), many of them with draft restrictions. Another reason was the willingness of many
container lines  to stay,  when ordering panamax-sized ships,  within the limits  of  the
dimensions of the locks of the Panama Canal in order to be able to deploy their vessels as
flexibly as possible. Nevertheless, after a first order of five overpanamax-sized vessels for
the transpacific trade in 1988, some container lines started ordering overpanamax-sized
ships in the early nineties, and the overpanamax fleet amounted to 247 units by the end
of 2002, with at that time another 56 mega ships on order for delivery in 2003 or later
(Figure 1).
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Figure 1. The rise of the overpanamax-sized container fleet (number of ships).
7 As can be seen at Tables 1 and 2, the carrying capacity is a major structural factor in the
container carrying fleet. All non cellular vessels in service or on order carried less than
3,000 TEUs. The 672 fully cellular ships carrying more than 3,000 TEUs in service had a
capacity of 3 million TEUs, that is 50 per cent of the whole of the cellular fleet and nearly
40  per  cent  of  the  whole  container fleet;  and  capacity  wise,  the  149  fully  cellular
containerships of more than 3,000 TEUs on order accounted for the bulk of the container
fleet on order. Within the very large ships category, the 209 Very Large Container Ships
(VLCS) of more than 5,000 TEUs in service accounted, with 1.2 million TEUs, for 20 per
cent of the fully cellular fleet, whereas the 69 such vessels on order represented more
than 40 per cent of the fleet on order. All of these, as well as some of those carrying
between 4,000 and 5,000 TEUs,  are overpanamax-sized,  and the overpanamax vessels
accounted for about 1,442,000 TEUs for the fleet in service (that is 24 per cent of the
carrying capacity of the cellular fleet and, overall, 19 per cent of the container fleet), and
for about 498,000 TEUs for the fleet on order (that is 48 and 44.5 per cent, respectively).
As can be seen, the world container fleet in general and the cellular fleet in particular are
experiencing a never ending race towards bigger vessels, the largest of which on order
have now reached the psychological mark of 10,000 TEUs in 2004.
8 As an original side note, one should point that this recent evolution has already had and
will have quite dramatic consequences upon the world quayside container crane fleet,
where the share of overpanamax-sized cranes is much higher, actually, than the share of
overpanamax  ships  in  the  world  container  ocean-going  fleet.  This  is  because  port
authorities  were  not  only  obliged  to  follow the  trend towards  wider  vessels,  but  to
anticipate it, in order to retain existing customers and to try to attract new ones. The
very same will happen in due time for cruise ports, for which the share of those able to
handle overpanamax cruise ships will  be much higher in the port  universe than the
actual share of these vessels in the world cruise fleet.
9 According again to Containerisation International, 3,109 container cranes were in service by
the end of the year 2002 (including 105 barge handling cranes, actually), and 1,285 of
these were overpanamax-sized, that is more than 40 per cent of them (Table 3). They
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were either built before 1998 (667) or after (618), but most of those recently built had a
very large outreach, between 50.0 and 56.0 m (262) or higher (194) ; moreover, most of
those on order (77 out of an overpanamax-sized subtotal of 131 and out of a grand total of
153) were of the largest variety. This shows that the container shipping industry has not
only  entered into  the  VLCS era  but  also  into  the  VLCG era  (standing for  Very  Large
Container Gantries). And as for tankers and bulkers, the days of the ultra ships (ULCS, for
Ultra Large Container Ships) and Ultra Large Container Gantries (ULCG) are on the horizon,
with however a more limiting technical factor for the cranes. And in the same way as first
generation  cellular  containerships  are  being  phased  out  and  scrapped,  already  162
container gantries out of the 3,271 built prior to 2003 have been scrapped, virtually all of
them panamax-sized; within these, nearly all were featuring a small outreach (less than
38.0 m).
 
Table 3. Technical structure of the world quayside gantry crane fleet as at 01-11-2002.
Includes 105 barge handling cranes, all of the smaller size.
Source: Containerisation International’s Yearbook 2003
10 Another major specific  feature of  the container shipping industry is  that,  unlike the
tanker  and dry  bulk  industries,  it  has  been characterized by  a  steady concentration
process as far as capitalistic ownership of the container lines is concerned. This is besides
ad  hoc technical  and  sometimes  commercial  alliances  whose  configuration  has  been
always evolving.  Nowadays,  most are technical  vessels sharing agreements,  known as
VSAs, instead of more integrated consortia (Slack, Comtois & McCalla, 2001). As Table 4
shows, the twenty largest players operated between themselves by the end of 2002 some
1,927 container carrying ships (most of them cellular) with an overall TEU capacity of
nearly 4.8 million TEUs, that is 61.5 per cent of the world container fleet at that time (and
a much higher proportion of the purely cellular fleet). And for the ten largest players, the
figures were, respectively,  1,357 vessels,  3.4 million TEUs and 43.5 per cent,  with 312
ships, 775,000 TEUs and around 10 per cent for the world largest operator, namely the AP
Moller Group. The latter includes Maersk Sealand (itself resulting from a merger between
the  first  and  third  container  lines  of  the  time,  namely Maersk  and  Sealand),  and
Safmarine (incorporating itself the former liner shipping division of the Belgian CMB
group). This group was weighting slightly less than the combined fleets of two of the
current second, third and four largest operators,  namely MSC, P&O Nedlloyd and the
Evergreen group (183, 160 and 143 vessels respectively, for about 400,000 TEUs each). 
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Table 4. The fleet of the twenty largest container operators as at 01-11-2002.
1. Includes Maersk Sealand, Safmarine, Portlink and Torm Line
(2) Incorporates Uniglory and includes Lloyd Triestino
(3) Includes Canmar, Cast, Lykes, Contship, TMM, Italia and ANZDL
Source: Containerisation International’s Yearbook 2003
11 However, these are global figures, and the concentration between a few major players is
often higher on some major trades and within these on specific routes. There is no room
here to trace the history of the mergers and acquisitions characterizing the container
industry, and suffice is to remind that, among the ten largest operators, Maersk Sealand
is the product of a merger, as well as P&O Nedlloyd, Hanjin/Senator, APL (integrating
NOL’s container division) or CMA CGM. Moreover, the Evergreen group has absorbed its
former  subsidiary  Uniglory  and  incorporates  Lloyd  Triestino,  whereas  the  fleets  of
Canmar, Cast, Lykes, TMM, Italia and ANZDL are combined into CP Ships (Alix, Slack &
Comtois,  1999).  This  was leaving only MSC,  Cosco and MOL as  the only independent
operators in the top ten of the time whose growth has been wholly or mainly organic.
Since the end of 2002,  the ranking of the main lines has changed somewhat but the
concentration  degree  of  the  container  shipping  industry  has  not  been  modified
significantly, as no major merger or acquisition has taken place.
12 For an outsider, container shipping may look like a quite concentrated industry, but the
concentration  process  is  more  advanced,  actually,  in  a  much  younger  and  smaller
industry  like  cruise  shipping.  Container  shipping  is  still  a  segment  of  the  shipping
industry characterized by a relatively high number of  players,  even if  it  is  obviously
experiencing a concentration phase under the pressure of globalisation and of the need to
provide therefore global shipping networks (Frémont & Stoppé, 2004). There is probably
room for more mergers or acquisitions in this segment of the shipping industry, perhaps
not in the top four or five because of the antitrust rules in the United States and in
Europe, but below in the ranking. And there is also no doubt that, like for container ports,
the Chinese lines will rise significantly by organic growth or externally (at the end of
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2002, Cosco and CSCL ranked, respectively, as the 6th and 15th container lines, and their
more recent growth has been quite dramatic, especially CSCL’s).
 
Two industries facing a dramatic expansion of
demand
13 The major container lines entered into the organic growth and/or consolidation race, as
well as into the overpanamax era for a quite simple reason, namely the dramatic growth
of world trade in general and of seaborne container traffic in particular in the last two
decades. The latter is well documented qualitatively, but it is more difficult to quantify
precisely, as past figures are quite different from one source to another. A rather simple,
yet robust, proxy of the rhythm of growth of the container industry is offered by the
cumulative TEU traffic of the 50 largest container ports in the world, as computed from
past and current issues of Containerisation International’s Yearbook. They show that these
leading fifty ports (the list of which has been changing over time, with always more Asian
ports entering into the top 50) grew from 14.9 million TEUs in 1974 to 35.9 million TEUs in
1984, 90.2 million TEUs in 1994 and 207.2 million TEUs in 2003. The growth rates were
most impressive: +140 per cent between 1974 and 1984, +151.5 per cent between 1984 and
1994, and +129.5 per cent between 1994 and 2003, a sustained growth especially fuelled in
the last decade by the dramatic rise of continental China. 
14 For  the  cruise  industry,  the  statistical  picture  is  also  not  easy  to  draw,  because
comprehensive figures are not available, strangely enough. The only reliable source about
the evolution of the main geographic segment of the demand is the New York-base Cruise
Lines International  Association (CLIA),  but this covers only the US-based lines or the
foreign lines operating on the North American market. Their 25 member lines and the
competitors included in their figures carried about 8.60 million passengers in 2002 (CLIA,
2004). However, the world grand total is far higher, as a series of lines are excluded from
CLIA’s  figures  because  they  are  offering  cruises  only  to  non  American  passengers,
especially  Europeans  and  Asians.  The  British  Maritime  Evaluation  Group  (MEG)  has
suggested that, actually, the world total was as high as 12.20 million passengers in 2002
(Ward, 2004), but no similar estimates are available for the previous years, unfortunately.
15 The dynamics of the market can therefore only be appreciated, yet imperfectly, through
CLIA’s geographically biased figures, accounting only for 70 per cent of the 2002 overall
demand for cruising (or more accurately the satisfied demand for cruising, as there is a
general consensus in the cruise industry that demand would be higher if  there more
capacity was offered, as long as it is marketed at the right price). CLIA was founded in the
early 1970s and its first reliable estimate amounted to 1.40 million passengers in 1979.
The figure rose to 1.85 million in 1984, 3.30 million in 1989, 4.45 million in 1994 and 6.15
million in 1999, meaning more than a fourfold increase in twenty years. It reached 6.9
million passengers in 2000 and 7.40 million in 2001, despite the 9-11 tragedy. This had a
big impact on the geography of cruising, with more «homeland cruising» (more sailings
from US ports, and less from overseas), but not on the number of cruise passengers. This
grew to the above-mentioned 8.60 million in 2002 and to 9.50 million in 2003, with a
forecast of about 10.50 million in 2004 (CLIA, 2004). 
16 These are impressive figures, but contrarily to our initial hypothesis, the overall rate of
expansion of the cruise industry has been somewhat lower, actually, than that of the
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container industry, as measured in both cases through two proxies (namely the traffic of
the top 50 container ports and CLIA passengers).  Indeed, between 1984 and 2003, the
(North American) cruise industry grew by «just» 342 per cent (from 2.15 to 9.5 million
passengers), against +477.5 per cent per cent for boxes at the 50 largest container ports of
the world (from 35.9 to 207.2 million TEUs). However, the growth as been steady over
time for cruise industry, with growth rates of + 107 per cent between 1984 and 1994, and
of  +  113.5  per  cent  between  1994  and  2003,  whereas  the  pace  of  the  rise  has  been
diminishing somewhat in the recent years for containers, with + 151.5 per cent between
1984 and 1994, and + 129.7 per cent between 1994 and 2003. 
17 As the average length of cruises is slightly below 7 days,  the 10.5 million passengers
expected in 2004 by CLIA member lines will translate into about 70 million bed-days (also
known as berth-days; this is the most meaningful statistical measure for demand and
offer, as in the tourism industry in general; see Israel & Miller, 1999). If one accepts that
CLIA’s  figures  account  for  about  70  per  cent  of  the  worldwide  demand,  the  overall
demand can be estimated at about 100 million bed-days in 2004. As shown elsewhere
(McCalla  & Charlier,  2004),  the  overall  theoretical  offer  for  the  very  same year  will
amount to about 102.5 million bed-nights, meaning a high occupancy rate of the ships, far
higher than for onshore tourism. This is because cruise ships are not only floating resorts,
but they are also mobile resorts, and cruise lines are therefore able to move their ships
worldwide in order to maximize their occupancy rates according to the succession of the
seasons.
18 Overall, North and Central American waters will account for 59 per cent of the effective
offer for cruising in 2004 (excluding idle vessels), against 24.5 per cent for Europe and
16.5 per cent for the rest of the world. Within North and Central America, the Caribbean
will account for some 41 per cent of the world offer in 2004, but this average yearly figure
is not very meaningful,  as cruise shipping is a highly seasonal industry;  actually,  the
Caribbean were due to account for 56 per cent in the first quarter, against for just 35 per
cent in the second quarter and for 27 per cent in the third quarter, before rising again to
49 per cent in the fourth quarter (ibidem). 
19 As most regional markets feature similar seasonal contrasts (in several cases with no offer
at all in the winter season), inter- and intraregional ship repositionings are a key factor
for the economic success of cruise lines. Some of these voyages, especially Caribbean-
Alaska repositiong cruises and round the world cruises, imply compulsory Panama Canal
transits on their journey and this is why cruise ships have for a long time strictly adhered
to the panamax standards, the more so as many lines have discovered that the canal is a
lucrative  destination  in  itself.  Nowadays,  there  are  also  many  regional  itineraries
featuring the Panama Canal as a strong selling point; these include either full transits
between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, or partial transits for ships entering and leaving
the waterway on the same side (usually on the Atlantic side, as an extension of Caribbean
cruises). 
 
Two major features of the cruise industry
20 Fundamentally,  cruise  shipping  is  a  branch of  the  tourism industry,  not  one  of  the
transport industry (Dickinson & Vladimir, 1997). It has inherited of the legacy of the great
passenger  liners,  but  nowadays  the  bulk  of  the  ocean-going  cruise  fleet  consists  of
purpose built vessels. Most of the former liners that had a second lease of life as cruise
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ships have now been scrapped, are idle or are confined to secondary roles (Middlemiss,
1997), with a few major exceptions like the panamax-sized Queen Elizabeth 2 (actually built
as  a dual  purpose ship,  namely a transatlantic  liner in summer and a cruise ship in
winter). Until recently, this was also the case for the Norway, but this overpanamax-sized
vessel is currently idle after a major technical incident in 2003 and her future is unclear.
She spent the first part of her career on the North Atlantic as the luxury passenger liner
France and the second part of it as a mass market cruise ship, sailing in the Caribbean for
Norwegian Cruise Line (Durand, 2004). Her former American competitor, the United States,
is also idle (but in this case since 1969) and she is reported to be in a very bad condition
(Miller, 2003). Nevertheless, Norwegian Cruise Line is planning to rebuild her for the US
market; as she is panamax-sized, one of her possible uses as a cruise ship under the US
flag (after a total rebuilding) is to offer U-shaped cruises between the Atlantic and Pacific
US coasts via the Panama Canal.
21 There is no comprehensive statistical source for the cruise industry and we established
therefore our own data base for the analyses offered below, with ShipPax’s Guide 2003 as
the main source of the vessels’ technical and ownership details. This unpublished data
base reflects the situation as at 01-01-2003 and includes 230 ocean-going cruise ships
(excluding purely coastal and river units) with a passenger capacity of at least 100 lower
berths. This is a better statistical unit than the overall number of passengers, including
the upper berths in some cabins, if any, because the number of such lower berths shows
the number of cabins and, hence, the physical size of the ship. It excludes old vessels idle
for some time and with little prospects of sailing again (including the above-mentioned
United States, but not the Norway that was still in service at that time), the more so as the
latest SOLAS rules for safety at sea are coming into force.
22 The overall number of lower berths of the said 230 cruise ships amounted to 249,630 and
their overall gross tonnage to 9,275,050 gt (gross tons). The gross tonnage is also often
referred to in cruise shipping in order to characterize the size of a cruise ship, and both it
and the number of lower berths will  be used here concurrently,  as there is no strict
correlation between both measurement units. Actually, their quotient, known as the space
ratio, is showing the qualitative level of the ship: the higher the number of gross tons per
passenger, the higher the level of comfort and of luxury of the ship. For the whole cruise
fleet,  it  amounted  to  37.16,  but  this  world  average  has  little  meaning,  as  there  are
significant differences between cruise lines, and even between ships within the fleet of a
given line.
 
The overwhelming dominance of a few major players
23 In a register of the world cruise fleet, a large number of medium-sized and small cruise
lines can be identified, but no real mega player seems to be dominating the market. The
largest individual cruise line as at 01-01-2003, namely Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, had
only 16 ships in service that is less than 7 per cent of the 230 above-mentioned active
vessels. They were accounting for 1,445,100 gt and 37,712 lower berths, and capacity wise
this was however 15.6 and 15.1 per cent, respectively, of the two world grand totals for
gross tons and lower berths. As can be seen at Table 5, where the fleets in service and on
order of the twenty largest individual cruise lines are shown, there was only one line on
equal foot with Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, namely Carnival Cruise Lines (it is usually
ranking first, actually, and it was due to rank first again in 2004, as it had more ships on
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order). There was a big gap with lines ranking further down capacity wise, like Princess
Cruises, Celebrity Cruises, Holland America Line, Norwegian Cruise Line or Costa Crociere,
whose fleets  in service accounted for  between 750,000 and 400,000 gt,  with between
18,000 and 10,000 lower berths each. 
 
Table 5. The twenty largest individual cruise lines (situation as at 01-01-2003).
Computed from ShipPax’s Guide 2003 (oceangoing vessels with at least 100 lower berths)
24 But as for container shipping, many of these cruise lines are part of larger corporate
groups, for the very same reasons (search for financial and operational economies of
scale, as well as of commercial scope), and the above ranking is therefore misleading. The
one shown at Table 6 is much more meaningful, with four major world players on the one
hand, and a series of independent lines on the other hand. The largest sixteen of these are
identified there (with, at that time, only one grouping among these as far as ownership is
concerned, namely between Louis Cruise Line and Royal Olympia Cruises, whose alliance
came however recently to an end because of the latter’s big financial troubles). 
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Table 6. The overwhelming dominance of four large groups on the world cruise market (situation as
at 01-01-2003).
Computed from ShipPax’s Guide 2003 (oceangoing vessels with at least 100 lower berths)
25 The above-mentioned four major players were, as at 01-01-2003, Carnival Corporation (46
ships,  2,560,650  gt  and  67,070  lower  berths),  the  Royal  Caribbean  Group  (26  ships,
2,166,300 gt and 55,674 lower berths), P&O Princess Cruises (20 ships, 1,341,450 gt and
33,238 lower berths), and the Star Group (17 ships, 932,500 gt and 26,384 lower berths).
Together, they accounted for 109 ships, that is slightly less than half of the fleet, but as
there were much bigger than average, their combined shares reached 75.5 per cent for
gross tonnage (700,900 gt) and 73 per cent for lower berths (182,366). This is a far higher
capitalistic concentration degree than in the container industry (as shown above, the four
largest container players amounted to just one third of the TEUs for the cellular fleet and
to as little as 25.5 per cent of the overall container fleet).
26 Moreover, the trend is even towards further concentration. On the one hand, as will be
seen below in greater details, a mega merger took place early in 2003 between two of
these groups and another merger might take place soon or later between the other two,
leading to a quasi  duopolistic situation (like in the aircraft  industry with Airbus and
Boeing). And on the other hand, even without those mergers, their combined shares was
anyhow due to be higher in the near future as most of the cruise vessels on order were
ordered by these said four groups (with 22 ships on order out 27, for 90 per cent in gross
tonnage and 91.5 per cent in lower berths).
27 Among the medium-sized independent lines, Mediterranean Shipping Cruises (MSC) and
Radisson Seven Seas (with, at that time, two vessels on order each) as well as Crystal
Cruises (with one vessel) were also due to grow, even if both MSC and Radisson were
planning to sell some older, smaller tonnage. Moreover, MSC had the unique opportunity
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of growing further after buying in 2004 two large ships of the bankrupt Festival Cruises, a
much  cheaper  option  than  buying  out  this  line  as  a  whole,  including  the  goodwill
associated with the brand. MSC has also ordered in 2004 two panamax-sized newbuidings,
and its fleet will  thus develop dramatically in a very short time; however, the cruise
division of the MSC group will remain far smaller than its container division.
 
The high value of cruise brands
28 In the container industry, a lot of mergers took place. On the one hand, this has led to the
amalgamation  of  fleets  into  a  combined  brand  reflecting  the  previous  individual
corporate identities (for example, Maersk Sealand, P&O Nedlloyd, Hanjin / Senator, CMA
CGM and Hapag-Lloyd). And on the other hand, one of the two brands has sometimes
disappeared (for example, Uniglory into Evergreen, NOL’s container division into APL,
CMBT into Safmarine). This is because container lines are all selling more or less the same
standard product,  and brands are therefore of  less value than in the cruise shipping
industry, where they reflect a strong regional anchorage. Moreover, at least within the
largest three groups, they reflect significant qualitative differences (shown for example
in the Berlitz Guide to Cruise Shipping by a rating system from one to five stars). However,
some subsidiaries have kept until now a distinct identity with large container groups, like
Safmarine within AP Moller or Lloyd Triestino versus Evergreen, and there is one major
exception with CP Ships that remains a constellation of individual lines (with some slot
exchanges, however). 
29 As can be seen at Table 7, there were, as at 01-01-2004, no less than nineteen individual
brands within the four largest groups of cruise lines.  In all  cases,  the main lines are
positioned, qualitatively, in the middle of the upper tier of the market, and they have
either sister brands at the same qualitative level in another region or distinct brands
positioned in another, upper or lower tier of the market. For example, within the Carnival
Cruise  group,  Carnival  Cruise  Lines  and  Costa  Crociere  are  positioned  on  the  same
qualitative level, but their main markets are North America and Europe, respectively.
Whereas within the Royal Caribbean group, whose main market is North America with
Europe as a secondary market, Celebrity Cruises are positioned at a higher level than
Royal Caribbean Cruise Line. A combination of the two strategies was characterizing both
the Carnival Corporation and P&O Princess Cruises before their recent merger, whereas a
merger between the Royal Caribbean and Star groups could be supported by the same
combined strategy of brand positioning. In the recent history of cruise shipping, there
has been only four exceptions to this general trend of keeping the individual identities of
the lines being bought, namely for Home Lines merged into Holland America Line, for
Admiral Cruises merged into Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, for Royal Cruise Line merged
into  Norwegian  Cruise  Line,  and  for  Sitmar  Cruises  merged  into  Princess  Cruises.
However other lines have disappeared, either because they were closed down by their
owners (such as Royal Viking Line at the time it was a sister company of Norwegian
Cruise Line) or because they went into bankruptcy (like Premier Cruises,  Renaissance
Cruises or more recently Festival Cruises).
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Table 7. The fleet of the four largest cruise groups and of their brands as at 01.01.2003.
Computed from ShipPax’s Guide 2003 (oceangoing vessels with at least 100 lower berths)
30 As at 01-01-2003, the Carnival Corporation was the largest of the four major groups, with
six well established brands. Carnival Cruise Lines is positioned at the upper tier of the
mass market in North America and Costa Crociere is  at the same qualitative level  in
Europe; Holland America Line is a premium line whose main market is North America but
with  worldwide  operations;  Cunard  Line  is  a  luxury  line  for  North  Americans  and
Europeans and with two niche market operations using mega yacht-sized ships. These are
Seabourn Cruise Line for the luxury market and Windstar Sail Cruises for, as its name
implies, unconventional cruises under sail, aimed at the premium market; in both cases,
most of  their guests are drawn from North America.  These two niches are marginal,
however, and they will be even more in the future, as there were no ships on order for
them (but ClubMed 2 could perhaps be bought by Carnival for Windstar, as ClubMed 1, now
Wind Surf, has already been), and as there will be a dilution effect with the recent merger
between Carnival Corporation and P&O Princess Cruises.
31 The structure of the Royal Caribbean Group is much simpler, with the main brand (Royal
Caribbean Cruise Line) positioned between the mass market and the premium segment,
and with another strong brand (Celebrity Cruises) at the upper tier of the said premium
market. In both cases, North American passengers are the more numerous, but there is
also  a  new  European  joint-venture  (Island  Cruises)  for  the  European  mass  market.
Currently,  all  of the ships on order are for the main line,  whose relative importance
within the group will therefore increase further.
32 Before it merged, early in 2003, with the Carnival Corporation, P&O Princess Cruises were
themselves the product of the takeover of the US-based Princess Cruises, positioned on
the same qualitative segment as Royal Caribbean Cruise Line, and of the cruise shipping
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branch of the P&O Group. The latter was featuring a series of brands, each targeted at a
specific segment, with the main line (P&O Cruises) positioned qualitatively as Princess
Cruises but with a strong British flair, and a series of five highly specific brands. On the
one hand, there are three brands for the British or Australian markets, namely Ocean
Village (a new club-style operation for British guests), P&O Holidays (mass market cruises
for Australians), and Swan Hellenic (cultural cruises for British passengers). And on the
other hand, there were at that time two different German brands (marketed under the
umbrella of Seetours), a conventional product (Arosa) and a club ship operation (Aida). 
33 P&O Princess Cruises was the group where the advantages of a group structure were the
more  visible  in  the  optimal  deployment  of  the  fleet,  thanks  to  a  series  of  internal
transfers. Two of them took place from Princess Cruises to P&O Cruises (a horizontal
transfer, qualitatively speaking), one from Princess Cruises to P&O Holidays (a vertical
transfer), one from Princess Cruises to Arosa (a diagonal transfer) and one from Princess
Cruises  to  P&O  Cruises,  then  to  Ocean  Village  (a  horizontal  followed  by  a  vertical
transfer). Another series of transfers took place in 2003 and 2004 after the merger with
Carnival  Corporation,  including  reverse  transfers,  and  a  reshuffle  took  place  on  the
German market where Arosa merged into Aida; however, Costa Crociere, now a sister
company, has kept under its own umbrella one ship specially aimed at this market, what
is strategically questionable in a corporate perspective.
34 By contrast,  within the larger Carnival Corporation empire, such internal moves took
place  only  three  times  before  the  said  merger,  from Carnival  Cruise  Lines  to  Costa
Crociere (a horizontal transfer), from Holland America Line to Costa Crociere (a vertical
transfer)  and from Seabourn to  Holland America  Line  (also  a  vertical  transfer).  And
except  for  transferring  one  ship  from  the  main  line  to  the  above-mentioned  new
European joint venture (horizontally and vertically), this did not happen within the Royal
Caribbean Group. 
35 On the contrary, such transfers have been quite common within the fourth major player,
namely the Star group, where two new buildings ordered for the Malaysian parent, Star
Cruises, were redirected before entering in service to its American subsidiary, Norwegian
Cruise  Lines,  because  of  the  changing  conditions  on  the  Asian  market.  Star’s
(over)ambitious expansion plans could be elegantly scaled down there thanks to last-
minute transfers before the ships were delivered (implying some internal adaptations but
no significant extra cost).  Moreover,  Star’s two previous new buildings have recently
gone to Norwegian Cruise Line, in one case in the context of an exchange of vessels,
showing another example of flexible fleet adaptations within a group of cruise lines.
36 Even if  Star  Cruises  is  the mother company,  the main line within the Star  Group is
currently its US subsidiary, Norwegian Cruise Line. Star Cruises’ fleet is more disparate
and this is the line where there were the more numerous «come-and-go» in the fleet in
the last few years, with only two new buildings in service as at 01-01-2003, and no vessel
on order after the second series of two were actually delivered to Norwegian Cruise Line.
There is also a third line in the group, Orient Line, aimed at North American and
European guests, a two-ship operation as at the end of 2002 but with one of the two
vessels going back thereafter to Norwegian Cruise Line in another example of reverse
horizontal transfer. This group is the only one with a new brand currently in the pipeline,
to  be  called NCL America,  with US-flagged and US-crewed vessels  to  operate  on the
Hawaii  market  after  the  bankruptcy  of  American  Hawaii  Cruise  Lines,  with  a  fleet
including up to two reflaged existing foreign vessels, two new buildings ordered by a
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previous, now bankrupt operator and perhaps the former transatlantic liner United States,
if she undergoes a total rebuilding after being laid-up for thirty-five years.
 
Carnival Corporation/plc as the new industry leader
37 As mentioned above, the first and third largest players in the cruise industry merged in
April 2003.Technically, it has taken the form of a takeover of P&O Princess Cruises by
Carnival  Corporation  through  the  formula  of  a  dual-listed  company,  with  Carnival
Corporation quoted in New York on the NYSE and Carnival plc quoted in London on the
LSE (with about  80  and 20  per  cent,  respectively,  of  the  market  capitalization).  The
impressive domination of the new giant can be seen at Table 8, where their combined
fleets amounted, as retroactively at 01-01-2003, to 66 vessels (that is 28.5 per cent of the
world fleet), with 3,902,100 gt and 100,308 lower berths (that is, respectively, 42.0 and
40.2 per cent of the world grand totals). The said domination will be even higher in the
near future, as most of the ships on order (18, for another 1,782,300 gt and 43,300 lower
berths) will go to the lines of a new giant sometimes referred to as Carnivore Cruise Lines.
This should be compared to the 13 per cent of the cellular fleet and the 10 per cent of the
whole  container  fleet  shown above for  the  container  industry  leader,  the  AP Moller
Group.
 
Table 8. From four to three (then two?) large cruise groups (situation as at 01-01-2003).
38 For many industry observers, it has been hard to understand how the US, European and
British antitrust authorities gave their green light to such a mega merger, the more so as
Carnival Corporation/plc will find itself in a situation of absolute domination on some key
markets. This has been especially the case in Alaskan waters, with 14 ships for four of its
brands in the 2003 summer season (for 847,000 gt and 20,094 lower berths) against only 10
ships (excluding coastal vessels) for five competing lines (for 724,650 gt and 17,475 lower
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berths). This even less understandable as Holland America Line and Princess Cruises are
there in an overwhelming position ashore (at least 80 per cent) thanks to their respective
subsidiaries Westours and Princess Tours. These offer highly popular packages combining
cruises and pre- or post-cruise tours in Alaska, including by train, for which they own the
whole fleet of panoramic railroad equipment. Strangely enough, Carnival Corporation/plc
has been given the green line without even being obliged to disinvest somewhat in Alaska
in order to keep there a reasonable degree of competition. One of the reasons given by
the  antitrust  bodies  (and by  Carnival/Princess  in  their  application)  is  that  the  main
competition is  not between individual  cruise lines or cruise groups,  but between the
cruise industry as a whole and other forms of tourism. It remains to be seen if they were
right  and  if  Carnival  Corporation/plc  will  be  tempted  in  the  future  to  abuse  of  its
dominant position.
39 Actually, the initial merger proposal came from the Royal Caribbean Group and it had
first the favour of P&O Princess Cruises’ management. It would have lead to a much more
balanced situation, with 46 ships each for Carnival Corporation in its original definition
and for the Royal Caribbean / P&O Princess combination. This would have ranked first,
with 3,507,750 gt and 88,912 lower berths, against 2,560,650 gt and 67,070 lower berths for
Carnival Corporation, but the imbalance could have been easily rectified as Carnival had
more capacity on order and as it had the financial means available to merge with another
player. For example, a merger with the Star Group would have lead with a quasi perfectly
balanced duopolistic situation,  capacity wise (3,466,300 and 93,454 lower berths for a
Carnival / Star combination, against 3,507,750 gt and 88,912 lower berths for the Royal
Caribbean  /  P&O  Princess  combination).  To  counterbalance  the  new  Carnival
Corporation/plc galaxy, the only solution left in the short term is a Royal Caribbean /
Star combination, but such a merger would lead to a slightly less powerful counterweight
in the short term (3,098,800 gt and 82,058 lower berths) and to an increased gap after the
ships currently on order are delivered.
40 Such a situation would have never been allowed to happen in the container shipping or in
the airline industries, and one still wonder why, at least, some significant divestures were
not even asked for, especially by the US authorities. For example, breaking P&O Princess
Cruises into two parts, with only its European brands joining Carnival Corporation and
Princess Cruises being offered for sale to Star Cruises, would have led to a much more
balanced situation. There would have been then three large players on more or less equal
foot and with no major qualitative and geographic overlap between their brands, as it is
now  the  case  with  Holland  America  Line  and  Princess  Cruises  within  Carnival
Corporation/plc (not only in Alaska in summertime, but also in Europe at that time and in
the Caribbean in winter).
 
The increasing share of panamax and overpanamax cruise ships
41 The cruise industry has entered into the panamax and overpanamax eras, for the very
same reasons (search for economies of scale) but much later than container shipping. As
Table  9  shows,  out  of  the  230  cruise  vessels  in  service  as  at  01-01-2003,  157  were
infrapanamax-sized (namely with a beam of less than 100 feet or 30.5 meters, as defined
by the Panama Canal Authority). However, there were 61 panamax-sized vessels (with a
beam up to 32.3 meters) and already 12 were overpanamax-sized (with a beam above 32.3
meters, currently up to 41.0 meters for Cunard’s Queen Mary 2 delivered at the end of
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2003). In the latter two categories, two special, older ships built as transatlantic liners are
included, namely Cunard’s Queen Elizabeth 2 on the one hand and Norwegian Cruise Line’s
Norway on the other hand (currently idle after a technical incident). Both were built in
the 1960s, whereas all the other large and very large cruise ships were purely built for
cruising, as many of the smaller vessels but much later than these. This is simply because
it  would have been commercially  impossible  to  fill  ships  with more than,  say,  2,000
passengers before cruise shipping had become a mature industry with a rather large
customer base, first on the North American market, then in Europe and more globally.
 
Table 9. Structure of the world cruise fleet in service as at 01-01-2003 by gross tonnage classes.
Computed from ShipPax’s Guide 2003
42 As can be seen at  Figure 2,  the first  purpose-built  panamax-sized cruise  ship (Royal
Caribbean Cruise Line’s Sovereign of the Seas) entered in service only in 1987, and this
segment of the cruise fleet grew steadily since then, with a first maxipanamax (a special
category, for which the length is the maximum accepted in the Panamax locks, namely
294.0 meters, as this was already the case for Queen Elizabeth 2) joining the fleet in 1998
(Disney Cruise Lines’ Disney Magic). Actually, the latter came into service after the first
purpose-built  overpanamax,  which entered in  service  in  1996  (Carnival  Cruise  Lines’
Carnival Destiny), as cruise lines saw first the benefits of going overpanamax in terms of
economies of scale. However, they realized quickly that they also needed, for part of their
fleet, the flexibility offered by the panamax design, optimized nowadays to more than
90,000 gt and perhaps up to 100,000 gt in the Finnish Nova project). Moreover, very few
standard panamax cruise ships were built recently, and only one was on order in early
2003 (four more followed since that time, however); this is also the case for container
shipping where the panamax design has been gradually improved to vessels of more than
4,000 TEUs of maxipanamax standard (also known as panamax-max).
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Figure 2. The rise of the panamax- and overpanamax-sized cruise fleet (number of ships).
43 What is unique to the cruise industry is that virtually all of the large or very large cruise
ships in service (Table 9) or on order (Table 10) are or will be operated by lines part of the
four  above-mentioned dominant  groups  (three  nowadays,  after  the  Carnival/Princess
merger).  As at 01-01-2003, there were 23 panamaxes and 4 overpanamaxes in service
within the Carnival Corporation fleet (plus another 6 and 6 on order), and the figures
were 19 + 4 (and 2 + 1) for the Royal Caribbean Group, 10 + 3 (and 1 + 4) for the then
independent P&O Princess Cruises, and 6 + 1 (but only 1 + 0) for the Star Group (excluding
the planned conversion of the maxipanamax-sized United States). The latter group was
clearly behind its rivals in the recent search for economies of scale, and its fleet still
featured a majority of infrapanamax-sized vessels (10 out of 17, including three ships that
were lengthened in order to be more productive). On the contrary, infrapanamaxes were
already less numerous than the other two, larger categories in the fleets in service of
Carnival Corporation (19 out of 46, including 7 very small ships for its two niche market
brands); this was also the case for the Royal Caribbean Group (only 3 left out of 26, after
most of its smaller tonnage was sold) and for P&O Princess (7 out of 20). At that time, the
four major players have only one infrapanamax-sized ship on order (for P&O Princess
Cruises’  German brand Aida),  showing how far they have gone into the race for ever
bigger ships. However, they still have the possibility to turn to the second hand market
when they need smaller vessels for specific niche markets, as was the case recently for
three of the former Renaissance mid-sized ships, two of which went to Princess Cruises
and one to Swan Hellenic.
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Table 10. Structure of the world cruise fleet on order as at 01-01-2003 by gross tonnage classes.
Computed from ShipPax’s Guide 2003
 
Overpanamax-sized ships’ ownership
44 When going into the detailed structure of the four groups by brand, one sees at Table 11
that,  in early 2003,  overpanamaxes were operated only by the largest  brand in each
group, namely Carnival Cruise Lines for Carnival Corporation, Royal Caribbean Cruise
Lines  for  the  Royal  Caribbean Group,  Princess  Cruises  for  P&O Princess  Cruises  and
Norwegian Cruise Line for the Star Group. This will not change in the near future for the
latter three groups (as Star Cruises has dropped its plans to enter into the overpanamax
era), but overpanamax-sized vessels will be spreading within the Carnival Corporation
(now Corporation/ plc).This will be the case at Costa Crociere (with carbon copies, except
for  the  funnels,  of  Carnival  Cruise  Lines’  giants,  in  a  clear  search  for  intragroup
economies of scope) and at Cunard Line, with the already mentioned Queen Mary 2.
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Table 11. Structure of the fleets of the four largest cruise groups as at 01-01-2003 by brand and
ship size.
Computed from ShipPax’s Guide 2003
45 At 148,528 gt, the QM2 is currently the largest cruise ship in service at 148 528 gt. This
will not last for long, however, as Royal Caribbean Cruise Line has ordered recently a
158,000 gt mega ship (3,600 lower berths) for delivery in 2006 (with another in option,
and probably more in the pipeline). Moreover, Carnival Corporation/plc is said to want to
keep the leadership with a planned series of 180,000 giants for Carnival Cruise Lines and
for Princess Cruises (sharing a same hull but with different standards of accommodations
to reflect the different qualitative positioning of the two cruise lines). Excluding these yet
to be confirmed plans and planned repeat orders of current, smaller overpanamaxes for
the same two lines, Table 12 shows the state of the overpanamax-sized cruise fleet as at
01-07-2004.
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Table 12. Overpanamax–sized cruise ships delivered or on order by cruise line as at 01-07-2004.
Sources: ShipPax’s Guide 2004 and Cruise Ferry Info 2004/7
46 To a much higher degree than for the container industry, there is a clear trend for the
major lines to order long series of sister ships or of nearly sister ships for the same brand
or  across  brands,  horizontally  (Carnival/Costa)  or even vertically  (Carnival/Princess).
Currently, the longest series of identical hulls has been for eight standard panamaxes for
Carnival Cruise Lines. However, when all ships on order will be delivered, the longest
series will be one of ten overpanamaxes for the same line (seven) and for Costa Crociere
(three); a figure that could even extend to twelve or thirteen (another two for Carnival,
plus one for Costa). There is also a current series of five large overpanamaxes for Royal
Caribbean  Cruise  Line  (plus  at  least  two  in  the  pipeline,  as  the  Ultra  Voyagers are
lengthened versions) and another one of five smaller overpanamaxes for Princess Cruises
(another two have been ordered recently at the same yard, whereas two rather similar
ships with a somewhat different hull, built in another yard; are not included). And for
maxipanamaxes, the same trend is being observed with a series of six vessels either for
Carnival Cruise Lines (four) or for Costa Crociere (two), with a series of five ships for
Holland America Line and with two different series of four identical vessels for Royal
Caribbean Cruise Line and for Norwegian Cruise Line (in this case, with two initial orders
for Star Cruises transferred to NCL before delivery and a recent order of two quasi sisters
directly for NCL). 
47 Except for two overpanamaxes of a different design built for Princess Cruises in Japan
(where a few infrapanamaxes have also been built), all these large cruise ships have been
built or are on order at European yards. These have managed to keep a dominant position
for these sophisticated vessels, whereas most of the containerships are currently built in
Asia (except for some of Maersk Sealand ships, built at AP Moller’s Danish yard), be it in
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Japan or in South Korea, whereas Chinese yards are also planning to enter into the race.
The European leading builders are Fincantieri in Italy, Kvarner Masa-Yards in Finland,
Alstom / Chantiers de l’Atlantique in France and Meyer Werft in Germany, but in the
latter two cases the order books are not as strong as what they were previously, and some
consolidation might arise as a consequence. Only Fincantieri has a solid order book, but
all  the  ships  it  will  deliver  in  the  next  few years  will  go  to  the  new giant  Carnival
Corporation/plc,  incorporating  P&O  Princess  Cruises.  In  the  near  future,  this  mega
customer could try to split  its  orders between two or three shipbuilders in order to
introduce competition between its suppliers. It remains to be seen if, like this has already
happened for the cruise groups, a concentration process will not also take place soon in
the European shipbuilding industry. This would also lead to an even smaller number of
players on the shipbuilding side, to counterbalance the likely rise of Asian shipbuilders.
 
Overpanamax-sized ships’ operational constraints
48 The  main  reason  for  the  cruise  lines  to  refrain,  until  the  mid-1990s,  from ordering
overpanamax cruise ships is that they saw total operational flexibility on a seasonal basis
as a key criterion of their success. The main geographic complementarity was (and is still)
between the Caribbean basin in wintertime and Alaska in summertime (Miller & Grazier,
2004), but there are also two minor, but highly lucrative markets requiring panamax-
sized ships, transcanal cruises on the one hand (Charlier, 2000b) and round the world
cruises on the other hand (McCalla & Charlier, 2004). Like Norway since the early 1980s,
the first new overpanamaxes started their commercial life by staying year-round in the
Caribbean,  but  their  owners  found  thereafter  new  geographic  and  seasonal
complementarities for their very large vessels on each side on the Panama canal, the
current pattern of which is shown at Table 13. On the Atlantic side, some ships spend or
will  spend the summer season either  in Europe (mainly the Mediterranean,  but  also
Northern Europe) or in the North East Atlantic out of  New York (Klein,  2003) before
coming back in the Caribbean for winter, whereas on the Pacific side they are deployed in
Alaska in summer and spend wintertime either on the Mexican Riviera or in Asia, after
offering a transpacific cruise (Douglas & Douglas, 2004).
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Table 13. Overpanamax–sized cruise ships cruise areas in 2004-2005.
Sources: ShipPax’s Guide 2004 and cruise lines’ web sites
49 This  situation  will  last  for  at  least  ten  years,  before  a  new  set  of  larger  locks  are
eventually built to improve dramatically the accessibility of the Panama Canal, as planned
currently  by  the  Panama  Canal  Authority.  These  new  locks  will  be  conceived  to
accommodate very large bulkers or container ships, and there should be no problem for
cruise ships up to 200,000 gt to be able to transit this artificial waterway. At least as far as
their length, their beam and their water draft are concerned, but the limiting factor will
be their air draft, because of the two bridges built across the canal. Therefore, the future
generation  of  panamax  cruise  ships  will  be  longer  and  wider  than the  current
overpanamaxes, but these vessels will not be higher on water. And in order to minimize
the number of less popular inside cabins, they will feature internal atria (like already for
Royal Caribbean Cruise Line’s giants) or even open pool or garden areas between two
blocks of balcony cabins on each side.
50 In the meantime, new operational patterns will  be explored by current overpanamax
owners, the first of which being year-round cruising in the Mediterranean by keeping
there their mega ships in winter (Ridolfi, 2000). At least two of the three overpanamaxes
of  Costa  Crociere  are  due  to  stay  year-round in  the  Mediterranean.  And if  it  keeps
growing at the same pace as in the last five years, it is likely that Mediterranean Shipping
Cruises will be the first independant line to enter into the overpanamax era and that they
will keep such ships year-round in the Mediterranean, as their non European base is too
narrow. The Asia Pacific area, especially South East Asia, whose forthcoming rise makes
little  doubt  (Douglas  &  Douglas,  2004),  is  another  likely  operational  theatre for
overpamanaxes, and this has already been explored seasonally by Princess Cruises, in
tandem with Alaska or Europe.  However,  cruising there year-round is  a more logical
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option for a regionally based line like Star Cruises, with new Asian-tailored tonnage if, as
the regional economic climate is now better, they consider again an earlier project of
overpanamaxes.
 
Conclusion
51 The cruise shipping industry has experienced the same type of evolution as the container
shipping industry, but at a much faster rate and, on the whole, to a higher degree. Both
industries, whose sizes are very different, are the product of a revolution, either technical
or commercial.  A few major features are summarized in tabular form at  Table 14 to
highlight the main similarities and differences identified in the paper in respect with the
topics that have been explored into greater details.
 
Table 14. The container and cruise shipping industries compared.
52 On the one hand, on the corporate front, a concentration process took place, leading to
four, then now just three dominant groups of cruise lines wherein several brands are
covering different qualitative or geographic segments of the market. The concentration
degree is much higher than for the container industry and one may even ask if the recent
merger between Carnival Corporation and P&O Princess Cruises to form the dual-listed
Carnival Corporation/plc is not one step too far in this process. It will be difficult to reach
again a balanced competitive situation, unless the Royal Caribbean and Star groups merge
also. Anyhow, the gap between the majors and the medium-sized players will  remain
much larger than in the container industry.
53 On the other  hand,  on the technical  front,  the cruise  shipping industry has  entered
massively in the panamax and overpanamax eras in a search for economies of scale, with
rather long series of more or less similar ships (including for different brands in the same
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group) in a search for economies of scope. These recent series of standardized vessels
form a much higher share of the world cruise fleet than what can be seen in the container
industry. This reinforces the competitive position of the large cruise groups versus their
smaller independent competitors. At the same time, the relationships of these groups
with the shipyards have evolved, and a concentration process could also happen in the
shipbuilding industry. Finally, the Panama Canal is still a limiting factor, both technically
and geographically, but less than previously as cruise lines have found or will implement
new operational patterns for their very large tonnage, in the same way as container lines
did previously.
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ABSTRACTS
After  container  shipping,  the  cruise  shipping  industry  has  entered  recently  into  the
overpanamax era, in a typical quest for economies of scale, at the same time as it was searching
for economies of scope, including through corporate mergers. To some extent, the evolution has
been indeed similar, but there are also some major differences.
On the one hand, it is obvious that building always larger ships, from infrapanamax to panamax
and  finally  to  overpanamax  standards,  has  brought  significant  savings  in  building  and
operational cost per lower berth for the cruise industry as per TEU in container shipping. And it
is also obvious that, besides these economies of scale, building quite long series of ships for the
same line or for sister lines has also been an attractive option for the cruise lines. Moreover, in
an another search for economies of scope, some cruise lines did not only expand organically, but
also  externally,  again  as  for  container  shipping,  buying  some  of  their  competitors  and
integrating their ships into their fleet after harmonizing the products. Or alternatively, they may
have kept the existing brands, because they had either a well-established global reputation or a
strong regional basis. This has led to the formation of a few major groups whose spatial reach is
now global, the largest of which is by far Carnival Corporation/plc, born in 2003 from the merger
of Carnival Corporation and Princess Cruises.
But on the other hand, there are significant differences between the two industries, one of which
being that the dominance of Carnival Corporation/plc is much more overwhelming in the cruise
industry than that, in container shipping, of the AP Moller group (itself incorporating two of the
previous  industry  leaders).  Moreover,  cruise  ships  are  not  standardized  products  as
containerships are. The most important difference is that same hull can be used to build similar
ships  for  brands  of  the  same  qualitative  level,  or  even  quite  different  ships  of  different
qualitative levels within the same cruise lines’ group. Another major difference is that the cruise
industry is still dominated, by far, by American or European-based groups or lines, and that most
cruise ships have been and are being built at European yards. 
Après le secteur des conteneurs, celui des croisières maritimes est récemment entré dans l’ère
overpanamax, dans une quête typique d’économies d’échelle au moment même où il était à la
recherche d’économies d’envergure au travers d’une série de fusions armatoriales. Jusqu’à un
certain  point,  ces  évolutions  ont  été  semblables,  mais  certaines  importantes  différences
s’observent également.
D’une part, il est évident que la mise en service d’unités toujours plus grandes, aux gabarits infra
panamax, puis panamax et enfin overpanamax, a permis, dans le domaine des croisières, des
économies significatives aux niveaux constructif et opérationnel en termes de coût par lit bas
comme par EVP dans le domaine des conteneurs. Et il apparaît aussi que, outre ces économies
d’échelle, la construction de séries relativement longues d’unités pour la même compagnie ou
pour des sociétés soeurs a également été une option attractive pour les armements de croisière.
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De plus, dans une autre quête d’économies d’envergure, certains d’entre eux se sont développés
de manière organique mais  aussi  externe,  à  nouveau comme pour les  conteneurs,  acquérant
certains  de  leurs  concurrents  et  intégrant  leurs  navires  dans  leurs  flottes  après  une
harmonisation des produits. Alternativement, les marques existantes ont été conservées, parce
qu’elles avaient une réputation bien établie, globalement ou régionalement. Cela a conduit à la
constitution de quelques groupes majeurs d’envergure spatiale globale, le plus important étant
de loin la Carnival Corporation/plc résultant de la fusion, en 2003, de la Carnival Corporation et
de P&O Princess Cruises.
Mais d’un autre côté, il y a des différences significatives entre les deux secteurs, dont l’une est
que la domination de Carnival Corporation/plc est beaucoup plus écrasante que celle, dans le
domaine des conteneurs, du groupe AP Muller qui inclut pourtant lui-même un armement né de
la fusion de deux anciens leaders mondiaux. De plus, les navires de croisière ne sont pas des
produits standardisés comme des porte-conteneurs. La différence la plus importante est que la
même coque peut être utilisée pour construire des navires similaires pour des marques de niveau
qualitatif  identique  au  sein  du  même  groupe,  voire  des  unités  assez  différentes  de  niveaux
qualitatifs différents. Une autre différence est que le secteur des croisières est toujours dominé,
de loin, par des groupes ou des compagnies basés aux USA ou en Europe, et que la plupart des
unités ont été et continuent à être construites dans des chantiers européens. 
INDEX
Mots-clés: croisières maritimes, transport maritime conteneurisé, économies d’échelle,
économies d’envergure, fusions armatoriales, navires panamax, navires overpanamax
Keywords: cruise shipping, container shipping, economies of scale, economies of scope,
corporate mergers, panamax ships, overpanamax ships
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